context: The PRC has recently speeded up work on carbon footprint standards alongside the carbon market. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology recently issued guidelines for carbon footprint accounting rules for key industrial products, aiming to establish a unified standard system and enhance carbon footprint management. By 2027, around 100 standards will be developed, expanding to 200 by 2030, focusing on key sectors like power, steel, aluminum, cement and electric vehicles.
Starting 1 May 2025, the PRC’s first national carbon footprint standard for the nonferrous metals industry will be implemented, reports Caixin. Quantification methods and requirements for greenhouse gas product carbon footprint: electrolytic aluminum was announced by Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) on 22 November, and spearheaded by Chinalco’s Zhengzhou Research Institute, with contributions from various companies including Yunnan Aluminum and Baotou Aluminum.
The carbon footprint calculation process is complex, involving numerous stages and challenges like ensuring accuracy, notes Caixin. The standard provides comprehensive guidance for precise quantification, offering essential data for carbon emission checks and supporting policy-making for decarbonisation.
The electrolytic aluminum industry, production of primary alumium, is a major source of industrial carbon emissions. It accounts for about 70 percent of the nonferrous metals sector’s emissions and approximately 5 percent of the PRC’s total carbon emissions. Aluminum smelting is expected to be confirmed included in the PRC’s national carbon market by the end of the year.
As the world’s largest aluminum producer, consumer and exporter, the PRC sees aluminum as vital across industries like construction, transportation and durable goods. Emerging demands from automotive lightweighting and renewable energy further emphasise aluminum’s role.
Aluminum underpins export growth in sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries and photovoltaics, where carbon footprint compliance is becoming a critical trade requirement.
Electrolytic aluminum serves as a foundational raw material for downstream processing but does not directly reach consumers, notes Caixin. Its carbon footprint quantification is driven by downstream customers, primarily to meet international market demands. The new standard adopts a 'cradle-to-gate' approach, covering emissions from
context: Sorghum serves multiple purposes in the PRC, primarily used as animal feed in the pig, poultry and aquaculture sectors. It is also crucial in the production of baijiu, the PRC's popular traditional spirit. In 2023, the PRC bought some 5.2 million tonnes of sorghum from abroad.
On 20 November 2024, the PRC approved sorghum imports from Brazil, a surprising decision given Brazil's limited history of exporting this grain. This move could serve as a barometer for US–PRC relations, particularly with the return of Trump to the presidency next year.
In recent years, Brazilian ag exporters have gained market share in the PRC at the expense of their US counterparts. Following Trump's initiation of a trade war in 2018, Brazil replaced the US as the PRC's top soybean supplier and subsequently became the largest corn supplier as well. Analysts are concerned that if Trump increases tariffs on PRC goods after potentially taking office in 2025, a similar scenario could unfold for sorghum.
The global sorghum market is dominated by the US, which is the world's largest exporter, projected to account for 56 percent of global exports in the 2024/25 season. Australia follows as the second-largest exporter at 23 percent.
On the import side, the PRC leads the world, expected to account for 88 percent of global sorghum imports. Last year, US sorghum exports to the PRC exceeded US$1 bn, with a staggering 75 percent of US production destined for export. In the 2023/24 season, an impressive 94 percent of US sorghum exports went to the PRC, indicating that American farmers are heavily reliant on PRC demand.
Brazil has seen its sorghum production more than double in recent years. However, its output still lags about 40 percent behind that of the US. Currently, Brazilian sorghum exports are negligible. It's important to note that Brazilian sorghum competes with second-crop corn for farmland. If Brazil expands its sorghum exports to the PRC, it could lead to a reduction in second-crop corn planting, which may ultimately benefit US corn exports. Goiás state accounts for approximately 40 percent of Brazil's total sorghum production.
In the US, sorghum is primarily grown in the Southern Plains, with Kansas producing 53 percent and Texas contributing 24 percent of national output. Kansas is considered a swing planting state and has seen farmers shift towards corn after the trade war began in 2018. The new PRC–Brazil sorghum agreement could significantly alter planting decisions in the US, potentially leading to more acreage dedicated to corn, soybeans and wheat.
The US sorghum industry has previously faced disruptions following the trade tensions that began in 2018. As a result of these latest developments, traders are increasingly concerned about the outlook for US sorghum exports in 2025 and beyond.
context: In a competitive employment environment where the number of college graduates increase every year, the PRC is pushing for more vocational education to create more workers with needed hands-on skills. In 2024, there are more young workers applying for blue-collar jobs due to rising salaries and increased enrolment in vocational high schools, indicating bottom-up changes in response to the party’s call.
A keynote speech on working together to promote high-quality global vocational education was delivered by Huai Jinpeng 怀进鹏 Minister of Education at the World Vocational and Technical Education Development Conference in Tianjin on 21 November.
Huai highlighted that President Xi Jinping places great importance on vocational education and looks forward to more international collaboration in this field. The PRC is committed to advancing high-quality vocational education through
The PRC aims to work with global partners to strengthen mutual learning, shared progress and implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development under the Global Development Initiative.
Main takeaways from Huai’s speech
These initiatives aim to inject new momentum into global vocational education, enhance governance capabilities and contribute to sustainable economic and social development worldwide.
Peng Binbai 彭斌柏 Ministry of Education Department of Vocational and Adult Education director, reported that over 200 vocational institutions across 27 provinces in China have partnered with 70 countries and regions, establishing more than 400 collaborative programs and institutions. Vocational education has become a key force in the PRC’s international education cooperation.
Future focus areas
context: In cross-border data regulation, balancing national security demands with boosting digital flows is a dilemma for the PRC. Tight regulations introduced in 2021, with unclear definitions of where data exports require state approval, continue to clash with Beijing's rhetoric of opening up the field. In 2024, Beijing has attempted to restore international confidence through the network data security management regulations aiming to provide greater clarity and certainty by outlining specific conditions for cross-border transfers of 'important data' related to national security and listing scenarios where the export of personal information is permissible. Pilot zones are used to test measures like general and negative data lists to explore best practices.
Following Xi Jinping 习近平 signalling it at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Lima, Cyberspace Administration of China unveiled the global cooperation initiative on cross-border data flows on 20 November 2024.
The initiative outlines core principles and frameworks of cross-border data flows, reports Xinhua
The initiative reflects the PRC’s proactive stance in global digital governance, with the focus on transparency and fairness to address monopolistic tendencies and prevent widening global inequalities, highlights Ma Liang 马亮 Peking University professor. It demonstrates the PRC’s contributions to shaping cross-border data frameworks, advocating openness, security and cooperation principles, says Wang Peng 王鹏 Beijing Academy of Social Sciences associate researcher.
Other comments on how the initiative may address provide solutions for global data trades challenges. It fosters global trade efficiency, speeds up industry digitalisation and bridges the digital divide through cross-border data governance, argues Zhou Min 周民 National Information Centre deputy director
The initiative offers a practical framework to address challenges in cross-border data flow, such as complicated compliance and raised operational costs after the rise in data regulation globally, argues Zhang Xianghong 张向宏 at Beijing Jiaotong University International Centre for Informatics Research professor.
Mutual recognition mechanisms across nations to align standards, advocated by the initiative, could facilitate innovation and trade efficiency, notes Liu Dong 刘东 Next Generation Internet Engineering Center director.
context: COP29 (2024 UN Climate Conference) has been dubbed the 'climate finance conference', with the ability of all parties to reach a consensus on climate finance set to be a key measure of the conference’s success.
Ongoing COP29 (2024 UN Climate Conference) negotiations remain difficult and at a technical level with limited progress halfway through the conference, contends Liu Zhenmin 刘振民 PRC special climate envoy. Liu says the remaining week is critical for achieving substantive agreements, noting that the PRC
Liu stresses the importance of setting aside geopolitical disputes to focus on the success of COP29. Political conflicts, such as those between some EU countries and the host country (Azerbaijan), and concerns over the potential return of Trump in the US, have cast a shadow over the talks, Liu says, adding that the PRC urges nations, particularly in the EU, to prioritise global climate cooperation over regional disputes and political divisions.
Liu proposes simplifying the negotiation process by reducing formalities and focusing on substantive content. This approach aims to make the outcomes more concise, meaningful and actionable, he says.
context: The Ministry of Finance announced its C¥10 bn debt management plan on 8 November 2024, focused on managing hidden debt and stabilising economic growth. This marks over one year of this new round debt relief that commenced in October 2023, in which special refinancing bonds and special purpose bonds were the major tools at play. Special refinancing bonds, first issued December 2020, were employed as a targeted tool to resolve debt in the most high-risk areas. This influx of new bonds could be the antidote that institutional and retail investors have been craving.
Five provinces and municipalities have issued a total of C¥224 bn special refinancing bonds following the Ministry of Finance’s C¥10 bn debt relief plan to swap out hidden debt, reports ChinaBond, as at 18 November 2024
Markets are paying close attention to potential supply shocks arising from the influx of new special refinancing bonds. The real supply-side pressures will be concentrated around late November to early December, since current issues have not reached what is considered 'large scale issuance', reveals an unnamed analyst to Jiemian.
This time, there is a relative even spread of bond issues with a ten-, 15- or 30-year time to maturity, which have longer maturities than issues in October 2023, highlights Xiao Jinchuan 肖金川 Huaxi Securities analyst. In addition, this new round of bond issues poses two main funding challenges
Since most special refinancing bonds are absorbed by banks, bank reserves are depleted, tightening money market liquidity. Yet, market shocks from special refinancing bond issues, primarily used for debt swaps, are limited, argues Li Yong 李勇 Soochow Securities analyst. Bond issues impact the market, but are not a deciding factor. Li maintains that the bond market is still stable and that a market downturn has not yet materialised because
C¥1.2 tn special refinancing bonds will be issued in the last six weeks of 2024, forecasts Li.
context: The 2024 APEC Business Leaders Summit in Lima received a written speech from Xi Jinping 习近平, sounding familiar themes, above all scitech development and green transition. In marked contrast to his 2019 APEC CEO Summit, 2021 APEC CEO Summit (virtual) and his 2022 APEC CEO Summit (Bangkok) speeches, Xi gave little space to the Belt and Road Initiative, focusing rather on the Global Development Initiative.
Xi Jinping's 习近平 2024 APEC Business Leaders Summit speech focuses on economic globalisation, Asia-Pacific cooperation and the PRC's role in the global economy
Xi's overall tone invoked cooperation, openness and shared development, positioning Beijing as a key agent of global economic growth and innovation.
context: The 2024 Annual Report on China’s Policies and Actions to Address Climate Change, issued by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment on the eve of COP29 (UN Climate Conference 2024), provided insights to the PRC's principled stance for this year's conference.
At COP29 (UN Climate Conference 2024) in Baku, Azerbaijan, debates are intensifying over climate finance, reports Caixin. The PRC’s representative, vice premier Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥, highlights the need for robust financial and technological support to strengthen global climate response.
Ding urges developed countries to enhance their funding and technology transfer to developing nations, noting the PRC’s commitment to this cause, having provided over C¥177 bn since 2016 to help other countries address climate change.
The NCQG (New Collective Quantified Goal) for climate finance is aimed at determining how much funding developed nations should provide to developing countries annually post-2025.
Negotiations have been challenging, as developed countries have yet to agree on a specific target, while developing nations have united in advocating for a minimum annual commitment of US$1.3 tn. A draft resolution prepared in October outlines a range from US$100 bn to US$2 tn annually and includes criteria to broaden the pool of donor nations, such as income per capita and cumulative emissions levels. This proposal implies that high-income, high-emission countries would also contribute.
The Global Development Centre notes that the PRC meets some but not all of the draft’s financial contributor standards, indicating the complexity of determining which nations should contribute.
Developing countries have emphasised that the NCQG should allocate funds equitably, particularly to climate-vulnerable countries. Meanwhile, developed nations have called for broadening the contributor base, suggesting that economically advanced developing nations meeting certain thresholds should also participate in funding. Developing countries, however, argue that this stance contradicts the UN principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', which prioritises the role of developed nations in funding climate actions.
In its 2024 Climate Policy Report, the PRC reiterated the importance of adherence to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement principles, cautioning against adding debt-related mechanisms that could complicate climate financing.
The report stressed the need for transparent, grant-based finance from developed nations to mobilise private sector investment without introducing debt burdens, keeping COP29 focused on achieving practical, balanced solutions for all parties.
context: Having already achieved its 2030 targets for renewable energy capacity, the PRC’s next priority in building a new energy system is shiftong to enhancing system quality and stability, with the growth rate of renewable energy installations expected to moderate.
The Energy Law, consolidates existing regulations such as the Electricity Law and Renewable Energy Law into a comprehensive framework, accelerating the legislative progress needed for sustainable energy reform, explains Wang Peng 王鹏 North China Electric Power University professor.
The PRC has already made significant strides in green energy, with renewable energy capacity—wind and solar power—reaching 1200 GW by mid-2024, surpassing initial 2030 goals. However, there remains pressure to maintain momentum toward the ambitious 2060 carbon neutrality target, says Wang.
The Energy Law supports green transformation in three key ways
The law emphasises energy security—a critical factor for economic stability, says Wang. It mandates improvements in energy supply stability, with a focus on developing robust energy reserves and emergency systems. In particular, the law requires
The Energy Law mandates energy market reforms, promotes technological innovation and strengthens regulatory oversight, notes Wang. It supports market-driven energy prices and emphasizes research, innovation and industry cooperation to advance energy technology.
With the Energy Law in place, the PRC is set to enhance its green energy and security frameworks, targeting a 25 percent non-fossil fuel energy consumption rate by 2030, signaling a transformative step toward sustainable development.
context: The second Trump administration's hawkish position and threats to implement further tariff hikes will present a grim prospect to the PRC. Nevertheless, President Trump's approach to trade diplomacy, often thought of by some as 'transactional and prioritising deal-making', could also present an opportunity to Beijing, which is seeking to explore and re-negotiate its position in the new global trade order.
Liu Yitong 刘怡彤 CF40 young researcher and Zhu He 朱鹤 CF40 Research Department deputy director, they lay out their forecasts for PRC foreign trade in three scenarios of potential US tariff hikes in 2025
context: A notice on improving geriatric medical services was issued by the NHC (National Health Commission) on 4 November, specifying that eligible Class II and higher general hospitals should establish standardised geriatric departments. The goal is for 80 percent of Class II and higher general public hospitals to have compliant geriatric departments by the end of 2027, building on a 2022 target set by the NHC and the National Committee on Ageing, which aimed for at least 60 percent the hospitals to establish geriatric departments by 2025.
Zhang Tiemei 张铁梅 Beijing Hospital National Geriatrics Centre professor highlights that geriatric medical services address the complex health needs of the elderly, encompassing disease prevention, personalised treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care. This continuous approach is key to enhancing geriatric care and is different from the current specialist-focused medical model.
Establishing and operating geriatric medicine departments across the PRC still faces significant challenges
Experts emphasise that developing geriatric departments requires dedicated policies and targeted funding to bridge this gap.
context: To centralise coordination over grassroots affairs, the Party formed the Central Social Work Department in 2023, streamlining local oversight via Party-building. Especially, the Party hopes to retain control over economic organisations. Following up, Xi Jinping 习近平 issued major directives at the November Central Social Work Meeting, calling for expanding the Party’s clout over emerging sectors. At the same meeting, Cai Qi 蔡奇 Party Secretariat secretary pointed to the need to strengthen the ‘maple bridge experience’, echoing the official call for pre-emptive risk prevention.
There is a need to standardise Comprehensive Social Order Governance Centre build-up, asserts Chen Wenqing 陈文清 CPC Politburo member and Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary, realising Xi Jinping’s 习近平 major directives on developing the New Era ‘maple bridge experience’.
Chen argues for
Chen notes that Comprehensive Social Order Governance Centres are a major platform that
To standardise their development, there is a need to
Chen urges Political and Legal Affairs Commissions on the local level to further cooperate with Comprehensive Social Order Governance Centres
The following officials attended the meeting
context: As a state-owned enterprise, COFCO serves as a key instrument for implementing the PRC's food security policies and expanding its global ag footprint. The company's increasing engagement with Belt and Road Initiative countries signifies a strategic shift in the PRC's approach to securing food supplies and gaining influence over global ag supply chains.
During the 7th China International Import Expo (CIIE), COFCO Group signed procurement agreements with suppliers from around the world, purchasing high-quality ag products worth over US$10 bn. Compared to previous years, the sources of these imports have become more diversified, and the import structure has continued to optimise.
In addition to maintaining imports from traditional grain-exporting countries, COFCO has intensified its efforts to import from countries such as Kazakhstan, Bulgaria and Argentina, which are part of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). Over one-third of the orders signed this year come from BRI countries, covering a wide range of products including wheat and rice.
COFCO's imports of wheat from Kazakhstan have increased by about 20 percent compared to previous years. This agreement will enable COFCO to further tap into Kazakhstan's wheat import potential. Kazakhstan, being the largest grain producer in Central Asia, is known for its high-gluten and low-gluten wheat varieties. Importing wheat from Kazakhstan not only provides the domestic market with a richer selection of high-quality food ingredients but also enhances the diversification of ag product imports.
COFCO also placed special emphasis on buying cotton and other ag products from the least developed African countries such as Benin and Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, the group is increasing its investment in Africa, leading the transformation of the local ag industry. In South Africa, COFCO has adopted a 'contract farming' model, incorporating local farms into its supply chain and forming close relationships with farmers at every stage of production and distribution.
context: The Biden administration's chip ban in September 2022 restricted PRC imports of hardware essential for R&D. The advent of ChatGPT in December 2022 soon shocked the government and the tech community, revealing its lag behind US leadership in AI. Since then, the PRC AI sector has been humbled and focused on playing catch-up. Yet, US sanctions are not the only cause of the PRC's AI setback. The lack of patient and fundamental research has hampered meaningful progress domestically. Computer vision unicorns, over-reliant on government subsidies and contracts, failed to profit and created a bubble in 2021.
AI in the Trump 2.0 US would likely see reduced regulatory barriers, including a ‘Manhattan Project’ for AI, says Zhang Yi 张毅 iiMedia Research CEO, which aims to
Trump’s AI strategy could hinder the ability of non-US companies to benefit from American AI advancements, anticipates Zhang. PRC companies need to prepare for this possibility and make some arrangements in advance to ensure ample room for response regarding
Trump will likely reinforce measures to curb the PRC’s AI growth, predicts Wu Shenkuo 吴沈括 Beijing Normal University PhD advisor and Internet Society of China’s Research Centre deputy director. Wu foresees a consistent trajectory of tightening regulations incorporating eonomic sanctions on PRC AI development.
Some legal experts believe that transformative changes in American AI regulations are unlikely, adds Yicai, as
Trump’s AI priorities and regulatory stance are documented in Yicai’s report, such as
Trump’s ‘American AI Initiative’ in 2019 is likely to continue, emphasising AI as a core research area and increasing access to federal datasets, algorithms and computational resources for US-based researchers and businesses, according to Yicai. Meanwhile, Trump allies are drafting AI-focused executive orders to establish the US as an AI leader and potentially institute industry-led bodies to safeguard systems from foreign threats.
Elon Musk’s potential role in Trump’s AI Policy is mentioned in Yicai’s report, such as
context: Donald Trump was reelected as US President on 6 November 2024, and the Republican Party is set to take the two houses of the Congress as well. This would count as the ‘biggest shock to the bilateral relationship’ according to Fu Suixin 付随鑫 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of American Studies. Other PRC experts are more positive and see Trump 2.0 short-term and incapable of suppressing the PRC.
With Trump's return to the US Presidency, new opportunities may open to stabilise and improve Sino-US relations, despite underlying challenges, argues Wang Huiyao 王辉耀 Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG) chair. His perspective is shaped by Trump’s pragmatic, transactional approach to politics. Wang envisions
Context: Interviewed by Guanchazhe (the 'Observer' current affairs platform) a week before 5 November 2024 US election, Yin Zhiguang 殷之光 from Fudan's School of International Relations offers, along with orthodoxy about the defects of democracy, insights into Trump's 'new allies'.
Trump's support base and new allies
structural issues in US politics
systemic problems
China relations and global position
future implications
context: The National Development and Reform Commission and five other agencies issued guiding opinions on actions to replace energy with renewable sources on 30 October. The guidance aims to increase renewable energy consumption from 1.1 bn tonnes of standard coal in 2025 to 1.5 bn tonnes by 2030, aligning with the 2030 carbon peak objective.
Interpreting the new guidance, Zhang Xing 张星 National Energy Administration spokesperson underscores the critical role of renewable energy in securing a green and low-carbon energy system. Zhang notes that the plan’s primary tasks include enhancing renewable energy capacity, increasing sector-specific renewable integration and expanding innovation pilots.
For a reliable and sufficient supply of renewable energy, the guidance calls for
The guidance prioritises renewable energy integration in key sectors
Emphasises is also put on pilot projects for emerging technologies, notes Zhang, highlighting trials in
New business models are also encouraged, such as cross-sector renewable integration in industries like agriculture and forestry and innovations in digital energy, virtual power plants and rural energy cooperatives.
To support these actions, NEA plans to enhance renewable energy policies, including
This guidance is critical for driving wind and solar projects and advancing new power systems, argues Lin Boqiang 林伯强 Xiamen University.
context: EU duties on PRC EVs (electric vehicles) entered into force on 31 October 2024 for up to five years. The PRC responded by launching three trade investigations on EU ag products. PRC experts have urged further negotiations and cooperation (e.g. voluntary restrictions and investment cooperation). Connected to broader issues like the reset of global trade rules as a result of robust PRC manufacturing export capacity, addressing the trade dispute may require going beyond the EV sector and delving into longer-term, dispute resolution arrangements between the two blocs via more detailed trade rules and institutions.
The PRC should adopt a non-geopolitical approach to address its trade dispute with the EU in the middle to long term, argues Jian Junbo 简军波 Fudan University Centre for China–EU Relations deputy director and associate professor.
In the short term, notes Jian, the PRC should balance bilateral negotiations with precise countermeasures against the EU's high tariffs. In crafting a strategic response to EU tariffs, Jiang thinks the PRC's approach has to be even-handed and precise to prevent further EU adverse measures while avoiding excessive reactions that may exacerbate tensions.
But in the longer term, a focus should be placed on creating consensus on broader competition rules rather than just focusing on 'smaller' issues like electric vehicle exports. It is only through reaching a consensus in competition rules that the two blocs can address their frictions bilaterally via more institutionalised and regulated means.
Jiang outlines his rationale for why the PRC should engage the EU using a non-geopolitical approach
Jiang sees the PRC–EU electric vehicle trade dispute as a potential catalyst for further reform and cooperation in their bilateral trade relationship, not least via
context: The US is often portrayed as in decline relative to the PRC. Xie Tao 谢韬 Beijing Foreign Studies University School of International Relations dean describes US hegemony failing in three aspects: gerontocracy, political institutions and global clout.
Gerontocracy
Political system
Declining global influence
context: Structural imbalances remain in the grain industry amid the record-breaking annual output. While the influx of new crops creates an oversupply in the market for rice and wheat, there is a gap between domestic corn production and demand, and soybeans remain largely dependent on imports. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs admit the national grain supply and demand are in a tight balance, a condition that has not fundamentally changed.
Zhang Xingwang 张兴旺 MARA (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs) vice minister provided an update on the ag and rural economic performance for the first three quarters of 2024 at a press conference on 25 October.
According to Zhang, the summer grain production reached 150 million tonnes, with both the summer grain and early rice harvests completed successfully. The area planted for autumn grains has seen a stable increase. As of 24 October, more than 80 percent of the national autumn grain harvest had been completed, marking yet another year of bountiful harvest.
Zhang stated that, based on feedback from various regions and expert yield assessments, most provinces have experienced increased production. While a few regions saw reduced yields due to natural disasters, the overall increase in autumn grain production is evident. Combined with the summer grain and early rice, the state's total grain production is expected to reach a new milestone of 700 million tonnes.
The area under cultivation has expanded. This year, the central government has significantly increased its financial support for grain production, implementing full-cost insurance and income insurance for corn, wheat and rice and raising the minimum purchase prices for wheat and early indica rice. These measures have boosted farmers' enthusiasm for growing grain. Adjustments in planting structures and the development of intercropping have also contributed to the stable or increased area for autumn grain cultivation, particularly for high-yield crops like corn.
There has been an improvement in yield per unit area. MARA, along with the National Development and Reform Commission, launched the soybean yield improvement project, and continue to implement the corn yield improvement campaign, as well as large-scale yield improvement actions for major oilseed and grain crops.
Localities are guided to implement key measures such as appropriate densification, improving sowing quality, integrated water and fertiliser management, all of which contribute to balanced and widespread yield increases. It is estimated that the contribution of yield improvements to the increase in grain production exceeds 70 percent.