Analysis

nuclear development three-step strategy 核能发展 ‘三步走’ 战略 hénéng fāzhǎn sān bù zǒu zhànlǔe

Proposed in 1983, the Three-Step Strategy envisaged thermal neutron reactors, fast reactors and controlled nuclear fusion as core tech in the PRC nuclear strategy. Viewed as an alternate baseload power for coal, the buildout is speeding up as it aims to decarbonise and become a global nuclear powerhouse. The domestically developed Hualong One, a breakthrough for PRC industry, is now the go-to model for most new reactors. Fast (read: more efficient) reactors are meanwhile being built. A state-owned company has been set up to develop nuclear fusion, aiming to build an industrial prototype of an ‘artificial sun’ fusion reactor by 2035.

new three 新三样 xīn sānyàng

Fresh export drivers, the ‘new three’ (lithium batteries, solar PV cells and EVs) earned their buzz-term status in 2023. Green industries nurtured domestically for years, their exports totalled over C¥1 tn in 2023, up some 30 percent y-o-y and claiming the PRC’s dominant position globally. Already heading for 5 percent of export value, the ‘new three’ hold pole position in future export growth, set to overtake the ‘old three’–clothing, furniture and appliances. Their success burnishes Beijing’s green credentials.

'jiwa' parenting 鸡娃 jīwá

In Chinese slang, jiwa directly translates as 'chicken baby.' This colloquial term describes the trend of parents excessively urging their children to achieve academic and extracurricular excellence from very young. It indicates the undue pressure placed on children, including those not exceptionally talented, to attain significant accomplishments, reminiscent of 'hot-housing' or 'tiger parenting.' This reflects the high expectations and fierce competitiveness prevalent in modern Chinese educational culture.

'the Qian Xuesen question' 钱学森之问 Qián Xuésēn zhī wèn

‘Why do our schools fail to produce outstanding scientific and tech talent?’ That is ‘the Qian Xuesen question’. It was reportedly put to then-premier Wen Jiabao 温家宝 in 2005 by Qian Xuesen 钱学森. An engineer and rocket scientist, Qian was born in Shanghai in 1911, leaving in 1935 to study in the US. Graduating from MIT and CalTech, he returned to the now-Communist regime in 1955, pioneering applied mechanics. After retirement, he served as senior adviser to the National Defense Science and Technology Commission.

unveiling the list and assuming control 揭榜挂帅 Jiēbǎng guàshuài

‘Unveiling the list and assuming control’ is a scitech funding method to raise efficiency. A two-step selection protocol, it alludes to Chinese traditional knight-errantry, which featured

jiebang 揭榜, drawing up a public list of challenges
guashuai 挂帅, identifying a captain via open competition between champions

The point is to drive scitech via open competition, setting challenges and rewards. To take part, teams sign 'military oaths’, define milestones, and commit to prioritising the challenge. Under the motto ‘let whoever can, do’ (谁能干就让谁干), there are few formal limits. Projects are evaluated by ‘real end users’, and rewarded based on practical results (curbing the ‘entry’ focus, in favour of ‘output’).

Raised by Xi Jinping 习近平 in 2016 (and again in early 2020 in relation to COVID), the term’s inclusion in the 14th 5-year plan made it a Party buzz-phrase. Forty ‘National Key R&D Projects’ called for by MoST (Ministry of Science and Technology) in 2021 initiated a subcategory for such ‘open competitions’, awarding C¥2 bn, some 11 percent of the total amount.

disorderly expansion of capital 资本无序扩张 zīběn wú xù kuòzhāng

Typically targeting monopoly behaviour, this buzz-phrase was flagged at a December 2020 Politburo meeting, then listed by the Central Economic Work Conference among eight key tasks for 2021. A euphemism for ‘high-risk’, firms are deemed ‘disorderly’ when their scale stifles innovation, harms consumer interests and swings public opinion via social media subsidiaries.

Warnings against 'disorderly expansion' were reiterated by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission at the 20th National Party Congress (October 2022). There was a marked switch in focus from entrepreneurs (e.g. Alibaba's Jack Ma) to senior Party cadres. The illustration depicts an unidentified capitalist driving unruly horses labelled 'investment', 'consumption' and 'exports' (of capital).

loyalty 忠诚 zhōngchéng

Political loyalty is even more of a refrain for the Xi administration than its predecessors. With the crucial 20th National Party Congress mere weeks away, the credo of boundless 'absolute' loyalty was by October 2022 aired at ever larger mass performances. Some sceptics invoke Confucian tradition, for which loyalty was ideally to a set of institutions, not to individual rulers. The illustration, which is recent, recalls the stiff, militaristic poses that symbolised loyalty to the Party in the early years of the PRC.

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