Through 2024 and 2025 the mood ran the other way. In late 2024 Zhou Hanmin 周汉民 CPPCC standing committee member, argued that the virtual economy held 'infinite potential', with the metaverse and tokenised assets as its next frontier. It grew more exuberant through 2025: a second-year equity rally, an AI build-out, and a rush to turn data and real-world assets into financeable claims.
A companion brief, Hormuz tests the PRC petrochemical build-out, argued that the PRC has won the low-end bet but that the most advanced materials are not yet within reach. The petrochemical sector in the PRC is really two industries, and Beijing's drive into advanced materials is widening the gap between them.
When the Hormuz strait effectively closed in April 2026, Beijing rode out the oil-price shock better than its Asian neighbours, and in doing so helped shape how the shock played out worldwide. Crude imports fell from around 11.7 mb/d in February to under 9 mb/d by late May, drawing on strategic reserves that had reached some 1.4 billion barrels.
Baseline thinking, dixian siwei底线思维, entered Xi Jinping's vocabulary in 2013. Alert to how such formulae shape policy, CHINA POLICY began to keep a weather eye on it. What is new in 2026 is reach. A formula minted for national security now turns up in flood directives and stock exchange plans, in energy strategy and EV positioning, in Politburo study sessions and township emergency drills.