In July 2026, eight polysilicon producers, representing more than 90 percent of effective capacity, pledged not to sell below a cost floor set by their industry association, rather than agree on a price among themselves. PRC competition law treats the two very differently; Beijing is now building an architecture on the gap between them.
A consensus unites PRC pundits on the country’s trade surplus: it stems from manufacturing upgrades and deeper integration into global supply chains, is broadly legitimate, and should be fine-tuned rather than suppressed by force. Where they diverge is on how.
Beijing began pairing richer eastern provinces with poorer western ones 30 years ago. The official goal now is a shift from moving funds west to building industries able to stand alone: demand-led, locally staffed, and judged by markets rather than by how fast funds were dispensed to set them up.
Twenty-nine countries signed the founding agreement of WAICO (World AI Cooperation Organisation) in Shanghai on 16 July 2026, in what Beijing calls the world’s first intergovernmental organisation dedicated to artificial intelligence. The agreement commits WAICO to 共商共建共享, ‘shared consultation, joint construction, shared benefit’, the formula Beijing has used for the Belt and Road Initiative since 2013, now applied to artificial intelligence.
Once a description of uneven post-pandemic recovery, the notion of a K-shaped economy has become an organising frame for PRC macro debate, increasingly common in commentary on the economy’s direction. The argument now turns on what is driving the divergence, and therefore what policy should do about it.