context: On 8 April, following nearly six weeks of the US–Israel–Iran war, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that Washington and Tehran had agreed to a conditional two-week ceasefire, during which talks would be held under Pakistan's mediation. Issues under discussion include freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's nuclear and ballistic programmes, Iran's support for armed and terrorist groups, reconstruction and sanctions, and a long-term peace agreement. On 11 April, talks were held in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. Although both sides reported progress, no agreement was reached. No further talks have been confirmed yet.
In a recent interview with Guanchazhe, Jin Canrong 金灿荣 Renmin University School of International Studies deputy dean shared his observations on the US–Iran negotiations, in particular
- the fact that negotiations are possible is entirely the result of Iran's resistance
- had Iran been defeated or surrendered, there would have been no negotiations
- Iran's strongest bargaining chip is its control over the Strait of Hormuz
- although the first round of negotiations has failed, the sides might proceed to a second round
- Pakistan can act as a bridge due to its unique ties with Iran, Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia, and the US
- Pakistan leads the mediation rather than Egypt or Türkiye due to its close relationship with the PRC
- Pakistan's actions are more likely to receive the PRC’s support
- anything backed by the PRC carries greater weight
- prospects for success are low
- negotiations will ultimately bring no results, and the conflict will resume
- a new round of military confrontation is likely to be even more severe
- over the past 40 days, US and Israeli strikes have focused on political and military targets
- going forward, it is highly likely that the US and Israel will shift their focus towards Iran's economic and civilian infrastructure