unforeseen costs of the war in Iran

In recent days, it has become clear that Iran is not another Venezuela, argues Wang Zheng 王震 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Institute of International Relations. Tehran has not only recovered from the initial chaos following the killing of several top leaders but is also managing an effective power transition and military counterattack, he explains.

Wang makes several observations about the conflict, namely

• US President Trump's aim to secure a swift victory and regime change in Iran has clearly faltered
  • to date, the White House has not articulated a clear goal for the conflict, leading to genuine ambiguity in its plans
  • Trump said in June that the US had ‘once and for all’ eliminated Iran’s nuclear capabilities, making further strikes on nuclear facilities unnecessary
• there is little evidence that military action is more effective than negotiations in addressing Iran’s nuclear programme, especially as Tehran has indicated a willingness to make concessions in talks
  • US military action during negotiations only demonstrates the lack of genuine sincerity about peace
• calls by Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu for an Iranian uprising after the start of the war, aiming to achieve regime change, were equally unrealistic
  • the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah
    • failed to bring about the expected chaos and subsequent favourable regime change
    • fueled the anger and reinforced the unity of the Iranian people
    • brought a fierce military counterattack
• the war's progress has spilt beyond Trump’s initial expectations, stretching from 'a few days' to 'four to five weeks'
• Wang warns that what he calls ‘Trump’s military adventure in Iran’ could backfire domestically, imposing heavy political costs and potentially becoming the final straw for the president.
• anti-war protests in the US are growing—even among some MAGA supporters—and as an undeclared war drags on and casualties rise, domestic divisions are likely to deepen
• on the international political level
  • the war in Iran is diametrically contrary to his declared and pursued Middle East strategy
    • in December 2025, the administration declared in its National Security Strategy report that 'the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy…are thankfully over'
  • US allies in the Gulf region have to
    • bear some of the war costs and damage caused by US military operations
    • face an Iran with an uncertain postwar future
• the war will incite hatred toward the US among a new generation of Iranians and further diminish Iran’s confidence in any future negotiations or reconciliation