Iran: a high-stakes gamble with an uncertain outcome

Wang Zheng 王震 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Institute of International Relations deputy director argues that to analyse the situation around Iran, one should answer three questions

what is the legal basis for Trump's war?

US president Donald Trump's legal justification for going to war with Iran is nonexistent, Wang states. At the international legal level, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits military action against a party that has not yet launched an attack or is about to do so. Iran clearly does not fall into either of these categories.

Wang claims that at the domestic legal level, regardless of whether Trump declares war, the extent of his military actions against Iran amounts to a formal state of war, exceeding the war powers granted to the US president by the Constitution: the authority to declare war resides with Congress. Trump's military actions were neither discussed nor debated by Congress and did not receive congressional approval. Wang admits that historically, presidents have sometimes used force abroad without a formal declaration of war, yet these instances usually involved some debate in Congress to secure full support. 

is Trump's justification for war against Iran valid?

Trump has yet to present a solid reason for war, which makes the so-called 'Iranian threat' seem like a 'complete illusion', says Wang. Currently, he notes, Iran is arguably at one of its weakest points in decades

• nuclear programm
  • Iran did not immediately resume its uranium enrichment program following the US and Israel joint airstrikes last year
  • according to the IAEA's assessment, it would take Iran several months to partially restore its uranium enrichment capabilities
• ballistic missiles
  • Iran's missile capabilities are insufficient to pose a real threat to the US, as Iran does not have the ability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles
  • it is hard to imagine that Tehran has any other military means of self-defence besides its limited ballistic missiles
• exaggerated claims that Iran supports terrorism and proxies
  • Iran's allies in the Middle East have been significantly weakened in recent years
    • in Syria, the Bashar al-Assad regime collapsed in late 2024
    • in Lebanon, Hezbollah diminished after the assassination of its leadership and the loss of its strategic access to Syria
    • in the Gaza Strip, Hamas sustained heavy losses under Israel's ‘brutal repression’, leaving only a symbol of unwavering resistance
    • the Houthi rebels in Yemen have been repeatedly bombed and their influence is restricted to a limited area
  • there is no evidence that Iran has recently increased its support for these regional allies or that these threats are imminent and urgent

what are the prospects of this war?

The prospects Trump envisions in Iran are uncertain

• Iran's missile and nuclear programs do not pose an imminent threat
  • even if the US can continue to severely damage Iranian missile bases or remaining nuclear facilities, it cannot deprive Iran of the relevant knowledge and technology, which Iran can gradually rebuild
• although Khamenei and others have died in military operations, the regime change that the US and Israel are hoping for may not materialise
  • neither the US nor Israel is likely to allocate significant resources to supporting a new pro-American regime
  • even if the US and Israel aimed to support a new regime, they might not be able to find a suitable proxy within Iran
  • if Iran descends into internal conflict due to a failed power transition, the rise of more radical anti-American forces cannot be ruled out
• Iran's retaliation could result in unexpected costs for the US
  • a resolute Iranian counterattack could still cause unforeseen damage to the US

As the answer to all three core questions is 'no,' concludes Wang, Trump's military operation is 'a high-stakes gamble with an uncertain outcome'.