context: PRC analysts see the US and Israel's Operation Epic Fury less as an Iran story and more as 'energy encirclement'. According to the Centre on Global Energy Policy, the PRC imported 1.38 million barrels of crude oil daily from Iran in 2025, accounting for about 12 per cent of its total crude oil imports. Now, turmoil and insecurity in Iran and the Middle East disrupt access to cheap Iranian oil and weaken Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure.
Zhu Zhaoyi 朱兆一 Peking University HSBC Business School Institute of Middle East Studies executive director assesses the impact of the war with Iran on the PRC interests in the Middle East.
Short-term shock is real and immediate, he states. The PRC has long bought Iranian oil in large quantities, he explains, adding that such an arrangement holds significant value for both sides under US sanctions. Now, the cost of the PRC’s energy resource purchases will rise sharply since
- Iranian infrastructure for oil and gas production and export faces risks of military strikes
- the stability of supply has reduced drastically
- risk premium of shipping through the Persian Gulf has risen
- the number of commercial vessels willing to enter the region has dropped by a great margin
At the same time, he continues, the asset security of dozens of billions of US dollars that Beijing has invested in Iran as part of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), covering sectors such as oil and gas development and basic infrastructure, faces significant challenges. Zhu argues that Iran’s role as a key hub on the westward strategic route of the BRI will be substantially compromised.
However, Zhu admits that the crisis also opened up some structural opportunities for Beijing, in particular
- Washington is heavily involved in the military conflict in the Middle East, and its strategic resources and attention are divided, which hampers its ability to consistently exert pressure on the PRC in the Indo-Pacific
- as all sides seek stabilising forces and diplomatic solutions, Beijing’s unique diplomatic position becomes clear as Beijing
- emphasises a tradition of cooperation with Tehran
- maintains strong economic ties with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia
- keeps channels of dialogue open with both the US and Israel
- the diplomatic credibility the PRC has built through its role in facilitating the Saudi–Iran reconciliation in Beijing in 2023 provides a solid foundation for it to play a constructive role in this round of crisis
Zhu warns that whether this opportunity can become significantly influential depends on Beijing adhering to what he calls 'a single core principle', namely
- not openly taking sides
- not being swayed by any side's interests
- always maintaining sufficient strategic flexibility
While Iran's power structure remains unclear, he states, the wisest choice for the PRC is to keep a low profile in communication with all factions in Iran and simultaneously strengthen ties with Gulf nations through 'increasing contacts without taking sides', thus protecting and expanding its strategic space amid ongoing changes, and sustaining an image as 'a responsible stakeholder in regional stability'.