context: New Delhi has been downplaying the significance of the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, failing to deliver on substantial outcomes for years. Along with other fault lines, including the unresolved border dispute, this has been harming the already complex Sino–Indian relations, which feature both mutual interests and deep rivalry, especially within the Global South.
Liu Zongyi 刘宗义 Shanghai Institute of International Studies Centre for South Asian Studies director calls India an ‘odd one out’ within the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), listing the following cases
- India refused to sign a joint declaration at the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Qingdao in June 2025
- India refused to join the SCO declaration condemning Israel's attacks on Iran and issued a separate statement in June 2025
- India–Pakistan military clashes in May 2025 challenged the SCO's crisis management capabilities and exposed structural flaws arising from internal tensions between its member states
To many observers of international affairs, India has already become 'an internal cancer' threatening the healthy development of the SCO, writes Liu, mentioning that there are similar views on India's role within BRICS. He argues that how the issue of India is addressed will determine SCO's future
- India's stance towards both the PRC and Pakistan has exposed the inefficiency of the SCO coordination mechanisms
- the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017 marked the SCO's first expansion into South Asia, significantly boosting its population and economic weight while introducing complex internal contradictions
- India's membership was shaped by
- Russia's desire to counterbalance the PRC's influence
- India's own ambition to expand its geostrategic footprint in Central Asia
- various contradictions have marked India's participation in the SCO
- while seeking to strengthen ties with Central Asia and Russia through the SCO, its ongoing border disputes with the PRC, opposition to the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), and long-standing tensions with Pakistan have made it an obstacle to coordination within the SCO
- SCO decision-making relies on the principle of 'consensus via consultations'
- since India's accession, the recurring India–Pakistan conflicts and Sino–Indian tensions have repeatedly disrupted its security and economic agendas, making the inefficiency of the organisation’s internal coordination mechanisms increasingly apparent
- India's disruptive role within the SCO has become increasingly evident
- since the 2017 Doklam standoff, India has treated both the SCO and BRICS mechanisms as tools to counterbalance the PRC's influence, rather than platforms for deepening cooperation
- in terms of economics, since India's accession, it has consistently opposed the inclusion of the PRC-led initiatives, such as the BRI or the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, in the SCO documents and encouraged other member states to support its own proposals for connectivity and economic cooperation
- in terms of politics, India has used the SCO as a platform to cater to its domestic nationalist sentiment
- in terms of security, India aligns with Western powers, actively participating in the US Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) with the US, Japan and Australia
- in terms of diplomacy, Indian leaders have been repeatedly absent from crucial meetings, such as the 2024 SCO Astana Summit, and even demanded that English be made a working language, challenging operational rules advocated by the PRC and Russia
India frequently exploits major diplomatic events hosted by the PRC to make unreasonable demands and engage in diplomatic blackmail, asserts Liu. Given this behaviour, the PRC should not be too concerned about whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends the SCO Tianjin summit. Instead, he claims, it should advance initiatives that promote regional cooperation and the development of the SCO, while promoting internal reforms that benefit the organisation's long-term progress.