5-year plans: 150-odd and counting...

will they enjoy common prosperity?

note: this is not a text to read—zoom in on the plans and links for your areas of interest (unless you enjoy devouring dry data...)

In recent months, agency-level 5-year plans have been coming in thick and fast, a plethora of second shoes dropping after the overarching plan for 2021–25 released in March 2021.

Ahead of the 2022 two sessions, we take stock of plans released so far and what is coming—including some that are highly anticipated. In late 2020, we published an extensive series assessing likely outcomes. We link to these at the top of each section.

Long-term trends have not changed. We fully expected Beijing to 'fortify the home base' in our September 2020 preview of the coming plans. But geopolitical friction now puts the national interest in yet sharper focus. And the buzzwords 'common prosperity', 'national security' and 'self-reliance' (largely reversions to type) steal the headlines. 

This will stay a live document. We will update it regularly as new plans are issued. 

macroeconomy

what we expected for macroeconomic planning

what we expected for innovation: driving on water

Due to ever-increasing competing priorities—carbon neutrality, national security, common prosperity, and more—PRC industries are becoming impossible for Beijing to micromanage. Hence, it is issuing fewer 5-year plans that will be more in-depth than previously. There are no longer separate plans for petrochemicals, steel and construction materials, but one that covers all materials; likewise, one plan that covers all renewables will supersede standalone plans for solar, wind and geothermal energy (see energy section below).

Self-reliance has risen up the agenda across the 5-year plans, both regarding supply chains and their underlying technologies. National security prevails over all priorities, not least in digital and data industries. 

Common prosperity is similarly a policy rubric across all 5-year plans. New measures stigmatising big tech as anti-competitive and SOEs (state-owned enterprises) as late payers are claimed to favour SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). Bridging urban-rural digital divides is badged as a major priority for the CAC (Cyberspace Administration) in the 14th 5-year period.

plans for macroeconomics

plans for regional development

plans for finance 

plans for industry, technology and innovation 

note: for innovation in healthcare, ag/rural affairs and energy, see below

plans for transport 

trade policy

what we expected for trade

With an increasingly hostile foreign trade environment, PRC trade strategies have shifted. The goal now is to move PRC exports up global value chains and develop new modes of foreign trade, such as cross-border e-commerce, offshore trade and market procurement. Promoting greater synergies between domestic and foreign trade is a high priority under the dual circulation strategy. While China’s export momentum is gradually fading as overseas production slowly recovers, boosting domestic market potential would ease pressure for small exporters. Building a modern commercial logistics system and expanding national and global logistics networks are highlighted across 5-year plans, serving Beijing’s ambition to gain better control over global supply chains. 

FDI (foreign direct investment) inflow has performed well despite geopolitical friction. More will be encouraged in high-end and low-carbon manufacturing, advanced technology and modern services sectors.

energy

what we expected for energy and emissions targets 

Xi Jinping’s pledge to reach peak carbon by 2030 and neutrality by 2060 will have far-reaching practical implications in the 14th 5-year period. Balancing tensions between short-term energy security and decarbonisation will dictate the scope of emissions reductions in the energy sector through to 2025. 

No 5-year energy plans have been released by Beijing to date, but if the 13th 5-year plan release schedule is any guide, a significant batch can be expected before the end of Q1 2022. Energy development is likely to take top billing, fleshed out by sectoral plans for electricity, coal, oil, gas and renewables. System-wide coordination is the stated point of not issuing separate plans for each renewable (solar,  hydro, wind, biomass, geothermal), as was done in the 13th plan.

plans for electricity 

plans for conventional energy

plans for renewables and green transition

plans for carbon peaking and neutrality (1+N policy system)

While these are not 5-year plans, they are highly relevant to planning given the role carbon peaking and neutrality will play

environment

what we expected for ecology-based growth

The transformation to an ‘ecological civilisation’, one of Xi’s key visions for the PRC, entails major restoration of ecosystems damaged by decades of ‘growth at all costs’. The 5-year plans already issued to guide environmental policy focus on zones serving major ecosystem functions: the Tibetan Plateau, where major rivers originate, and northern arable land threatened by desertification. Partly focused on reversing environmental degradation, the plans equally address deficiencies in governance. Schemes rewarding protection and restoration will be expanded via ecological damage compensation, natural asset rights trading and carbon sink trading. Penalising waste and building a circular economy will be focal points in coming years, serving economic and resource security goals as well as environmental priorities.

plans for ecosystem protection and restoration

  • 2021–35 plan on major projects for protecting and restoring important national ecosystems (in Chinese)
  • 2021–35 plan on ecological protection and restoration support system key project construction (in Chinese)
  • 2021–30 plans for ‘two barriers and three belts 兩屏三帶’
    • southern hills belt ecological protection and restoration (in Chinese)
    • northern anti-desertification belt ecological protection and restoration (in Chinese)
    • northeastern forestry belt ecological protection and restoration (in Chinese)
    • Tibetan plateau ecological barrier ecological protection and restoration (in Chinese)
    • loess plateau-Sichuan-Yunnan ecological barrier ecological protection and restoration (expected)
  • ecological and environment popularisation (in Chinese)
  • ecological protection and economic transformation in the Greater and Lesser Khingan Mountains (in Chinese)
  • marine environmental protection (expected)
  • Yangtze River midstream city cluster development (expected)

plans for enforcement and standards

  • administrative enforcement teams for ecological and environment protection (in Chinese)
  • environmental impact assessment and pollutant discharge permit reform (expected)
  • standardised environmental management assessment for hazardous waste (in Chinese)
  • ecological and environmental monitoring (in Chinese)
  • publicity, education and systemic law-based governance of national forests and grasslands (in Chinese)

plans for waste and circular economy

plans for natural resources

agriculture

what we expected as ag switches from production to productivity

what we expected for managing marine fisheries

Feeding the massive population is the immutable baseline of PRC ag policy. With demand growing and consumer tastes diversifying, the focus is shifting from production to productivity. Mechanisation and ‘smart’ tech, promoting advances in both quantity and quality, are relied on for optimal use of the PRC’s limited ag resources. As a result of the top-down drive for common prosperity, rural people and regions can expect continued policy attention. Rural human resources, infrastructure and industry are pledged investment to narrow the urban-rural divide, potentially reconfiguring the countryside into a much-needed driver for domestic growth. Facing uncertainties in global agrifood market, the state also seeks deeper cooperation to set up stable trade and investment relations worldwide, as well as make the ‘China solution’ part of international rules.

plans for ag trade 

plans for ag modernisation

plans for ag commodities

plans for ag tech and inputs

plans for rural revitalisation 

governance

what we expected from Xi Jinping thought for new era

With ‘building a law-based nation’ a goal for the 14th 5-year period, law-based governance and legal reform will be promoted. Beijing is standardising and digitising governance and supervision, focusing on tackling issues that have arisen in the digital age and inform the foundation of the system long-term. Provision of legal services and the cultivation of a regulation-abiding citizenry are the focus of attention. There will be a focus on building international recognition of the PRC’s legal system. 

Following significant education and rectification in the political and legal system in 2021, the integrity of the judiciary will remain under close scrutiny throughout the 5-year period. Meanwhile, despite the imperative to maintain stability, arrests and prosecutions are to trend down and petition against judicial findings decrease.

IP policy will support firms to go global by providing basic data and helping in defending rights cases. National security will be a focus. While pushing legislation forward, CNIPA is engaged in developing IP for financial services and strengthening its own expertise. 

plans for law-based governance, judiciary and the procuratorate 

plans for intellectual property

plans for culture, media and tourism

society

what we expected for health in an ageing society

what we expected in education planning

Boosting the birthrate and improving access to public services are the social policy priorities for 5-year planning. The pursuit of common prosperity will translate into more accessible preschool and basic education, vocational ed, affordable homes, and health and aged care. Youth unemployment is to be addressed, as is mitigating structural unemployment due to tech innovation and COVID-19. Ensuring ‘every hard-working citizen lives a decent life’ is a general theme. 

In a departure from earlier plans, the funding program suggests a return to public spending over private investment. From strengthening public K–12 schools to enhancing grassroots public hospitals, the state seeks to correct welfare distribution that has made use of market forces. This has skewed too much towards the top 10 percent of the urban elite who made their fortunes in the era of liberalisation.

plans for education

plans for health

plans for other social sectors

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