upswings in bilateral ties belie lingering doubts and limitations
Of global significance, relations between China and Russia are less solid than rhetoric suggests. Officially the two countries have never been closer, but a trust deficit compounded with diverging interests are felt by respected voices in China to undermine political, economic and social relations. Premier Li Keqiang, hailing the opening of the Heilongjiang Bridge, a first of its kind, 16 Sep 2019, helped set the scene for promoting the existing 'strategic partnership' to a 'new era' strategic partnership. No small matter in terms of diplomatic symbolism, this is not the whole story.
economic ties cooler than rhetoric
Bilateral trade is dominated by Russian energy exports. These are, warns veteran CASS Russianist Lu Nanquan 陆南泉, susceptible to oil market fluctuations. The China–Russia east-route gas pipeline, launched 2 Dec 2019, helps consolidate relations, claims Xing Guangcheng 邢广程CASS Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies. The investment assumes long-term political stability within and between the nations, but praise for the project is typically couched in terms of what more needs to be done.
Its strategic pivot to Asia notwithstanding, Russia’s economic focus remains in Europe. In Asia, its partners beyond China include Japan, India and Vietnam. On top of this, BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) cooperation has not met expectations. For example, the Moscow–Kazan high-speed rail project is reportedly at risk of suspension due to lack of capital and low prospective passenger numbers. Science and technology cooperation is likewise reporting mediocre results.
trust and friendship
‘People-to-people friendship’ is regularly raised by Chinese officials as excellent but inadequate. Understanding between Chinese and Russians, let alone interest in each other, has historically been limited. Relations remain dictated from the top, in hope of a trickle-down effect. The idea that ‘positive momentum' for greater intimacy has become irreversible, as claimed by Ou Yi 欧诣 international affairs observer, is not warranted on the ground. Liu Hui 李辉 , ambassador to Moscow 2009–19, claimed relations ‘were now as close as lips and teeth’, but few echo this invocation of Beijing-Pyongyang fraternal warmth.
Huang Renwei 黄仁伟 Fudan University Institute of Belt and Road and Global Governance is forthright that despite their vaunted partnership, China and Russia will not become allies. This is a result of the narrow scope of Sino–Russian relations. Once fixated on security, ties are now more commercial in nature and alliance is no longer appropriate or desirable.
To address the trust deficit, adds Huang, the two need to encourage cultural exchange by learning each other’s languages and appreciating each other’s history and culture (ironic, considering the generation of Russian speakers who fell under a political shadow in the late Mao era). Cooperation should be supported by better legal guarantees, Huang urges, like more predictable visa rules for Chinese business people operating in Russia. Firms should, he emphasises, be allowed access to local financing when operating in the other country.
Though fewer Russian voices are warning of the threat of China, they do exist. One result of this, notes Lu Nanquan, is that Chinese companies’ enthusiasm to invest in Russia is dampened by security risks.
global strategy
China and Russia do share a number of geostrategic interests, and work together to further these in the international arena. Coinciding with the 4 Dec 2019 NATO summit in London, which discussed challenges from both Russia and China, a 15th iteration of Sino–Russian security consultation took place. ‘Resolutely opposing external interference’, the meeting agreed to ‘firmly support each other’s core interests’, ‘support multilateralism’ and ‘oppose unilateralism and bullying’. Both sides vowed to ‘work together to maintain global strategic stability’. In particular, they agreed to oppose the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and to promote the political settlement of nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran. Avoiding choosing between the US and Iran, however, China is seen to have different goals to Russia in the Middle East.
On 16 Dec 2019, China and Russia proposed in a draft resolution that the UN Security Council lift a ban on certain North Korean exports and exempt inter-Korean rail and road projects from sanctions. It also called for the resumption of six-party talks, in which China and Russia are participants. The proposal offers, argues Wang Peng 王鹏 Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, some much needed ‘positive energy’ to encourage North Korea to comply with UN resolutions. It reflects the two governments’ political wisdom and strategic vision, he claims, as well as their sense of responsibility for the region and the world an understanding of the ‘shared destiny of mankind’.
US ‘containment’
The National Defence Authorisation Act passed by the House of Representatives 11 Dec 2019 was interpreted as firm US commitment to containing both China and Russia. Authorising some US$750 bn in defence spending and adding a sixth military arm, the Space Force, the bill was supported by both Republicans and Democrats, at a time of scorched earth rivalry between the parties. It therefore reflects, argues Liu Weidong 刘卫东 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of American Studies, a high degree of consensus among US politicians on the threat posed by both China and Russia.
One Sino–Russian project facing US obstruction is the Polar Silk Road. Beijing and Moscow agreed to develop it jointly in 2017 but, warns Xiao Yang 肖洋 Beijing International Studies University School of International Relations, Washington has taken to ‘blocking’ it, hoping to reduce its advantage and attraction.
The perceived threat to both China and Russia from the US and its allies has been a long-term driver of bilateral relations. In the current international melée the interests of China and Russia often converge, but to read this as bilateral bliss would be erroneous. The Arctic and Siberia are Russia’s backyard, where China’s neighbourly image is being tested. While supporting each other on the international stage to further their separate interests, their ties are brittle.
what are the experts saying?
Xing Guangcheng 邢广程 | CASS Chinese Border Research Institute director
Trained as a Soviet–Eastern bloc expert, Xing works mainly on Russian politics and diplomacy, Central Asia, SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and Soviet history. He headed the CASS Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies before joining the Border Research Institute in 2009, while also directing the CASS Centre for SCO Studies and deputy-directing the China Centre for SCO Studies. Russians see China in two opposite ways, he recently argued. Some, generally hyper-nationalists or those beguiled by Western media, see it as a threat. Others, like Putin, see opportunity. But even the latter see Russian and Central Asian trade imbalances as problems. Therefore, he said, more needs to be done to maintain bilateral relations.
Wang Peng 王鹏 | Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies associate research fellow
An official media columnist, Wang works on domestic topics such as party building, as well as foreign relations and Asia-Pacific security. Increasing interaction with the US, he recently argued, is on the cards once it retreats from the Middle East and shifts strategic focus to East Asia. China must, he urges, play a leading role in US–North Korea negotiations to ensure national interests and regional security.
Xiao Yang 肖洋 | Beijing International Studies University School of International Relations associate professor
China Foreign Affairs University trained, Xiao is an expert in Arctic security and economic development. China should, he argues, boost cooperation with Russia in Arctic affairs, expanding its participation in Arctic governance and strengthening the economic basis of the Sino-Russia partnership. Greenland will, he feels, be a key node for the successful implementation of the Polar Silk Road.