falling short of modernity: latest instalment of Xi Jinping thought
4th Plenum: still being unpacked
Held 28-29 October, the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee has faded from international media. For Beijing, though, the show is just getting started. A political set-piece of high value, its political dividend must be carefully curated and distributed.
As usual, the Plenum launched buzzwords that need unpacking for Chinese speakers and even more for the outside world. ‘China-governance’ 中国之治 is key among these. It projects a slightly classical and obscure image in Chinese (as in the picture above) and is being deployed to counter pressure from the West to reinvigorate reform.
why governance?
The term ‘governance’ gained currency in the West in the 1990s when the World Bank and thinktanks took stock of blockages to development not attributable to economics. It was a buzzword loaded with ethical and political notions such as due process, transparency, accountability and so on.
The Chinese term ‘zhili’ 治理, routinely translated as ‘governance’, once carried other overtones, e.g. of ‘punishment’ or 'correction', together with implications of an unquestionable source of order or principle.
By the time the Party was recovering from Mao’s efforts to detangle China’s economic fortunes from traditional thought, and ushering in market forces, Western ideas about governance had been asserted globally in the Bretton Woods institutions. China had to counter the growing link between good governance and democratic process. Seeking consistency with the one-party system, the Party reasserted confidence in ‘excellent Chinese culture’. ‘China Dream’, ‘China Solution’, the ‘shared future for mankind’ and ‘Xi Jinping new era thought’ carved out a conceptual space that ‘China-governance’ now bids to encompass.
what is ‘modern’ China-governance?
Xi Jinping told the Fourth Plenum that he is modernising Chinese governance. From what we see so far, the Party is unwilling, indeed unable, to crystallise what this means. There are several reasons.
Most basically, domestic and international audiences are told, and hear, different messages. What works as a pep talk internally is read with enthusiasm by financial markets, nervously by regional neighbours, sceptically by strategic rivals.
What deeply shifts thinking in the Party about governance however is the tech-trade war. ‘Decoupling’ from the US as a real option arose as preparations were underway for the Fourth Plenum. A growing disquiet about what decoupling threatens lies at the base of ‘China-governance’.
A commentator in Shanghai lists decoupling’s implications for ‘China-governance’
- political multi-polarity
- hegemonism and power politics still exist, but emerging markets and developing countries are on the rise; international relations are ever more complex
- economic globalisation
- protectionism and unilateralism are intensifying with growing deficits in governance, development and trust, but globalisation is irreversible
- informatisation of society
- AI, big data, quantum computing, biotech, etc. are triggering technological and industrial revolutions
- cultural diversity
- the trend towards mutual learning between civilisations reinforces Xi’s ‘community of shared future for mankind’
All these factors, says the commentator, will in the (inevitably decoupled) future have an impact on the Party’s control over society, economics and ultimately, politics.
telling the world
The rhetorical heat about China-governance is a function of uncertainty and instability in Beijing’s governing institutions. The Party is returning to the well-worn territory of insisting on the need for ‘struggle’. It prioritises ‘proper telling of the China story’ in speeches and statements, while the propaganda system is doubling down on Party discipline domestically, and on what are in fact ‘motherhood’ values from the West’s liberal enlightenment. The message to both domestic and international audiences is that China-governance is rational, resilient, steadfast, temperate. China-governance’ is intended to project pride, independence and, of course, self-confidence, and to suggest continuity with the tradition of ‘grand unity’ and centralised control. But used in these rhetorical ways, it tends to lose any clear and fixed meaning.
Ultimately, Beijing is marketing business as usual. It is utilising ‘China-governance’ as shorthand for a strong nation, but the current mantra of total reliance on the leader looks more feudal than modern. This new buzzword is part of a long tradition of rhetoric employed to hide vulnerability and radiate strength to domestic and international audiences; the current instability in the relationship with the US and the pressures from the international community to reform (rather than merely open up) are the most recent catalysts.
what are the experts saying?
Wei Jianing 魏加宁 | State Council Development Research Centre Macroeconomy Department, deputy director
Respected as a State Council technocrat, Wei has been a critic of statistics that fabricate a rosy picture of the economy. China must, argues Wei, prevent ‘decoupling’ with the United States because it could lead to war and the loss of China’s ‘peace dividend’.
Xue Li 薛力 | CASS International Strategy Department, Institute of World Economy and Politics, director
Xue comments frequently on headline issues, maintaining a critical perspective while never opposing the main Party position on BRI, Myanmar, the trade tech war, etc. An early proponent of further opening the economy to investment, he favours, by implication, tempering the ‘self-sufficient civilisation’ narrative with respect for international governance norms.
Rong Jian 荣剑 | independent scholar
A rising star in the Marxism Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Rong fell from favour after June Fourth, but became wealthy in the real estate boom. Moving into the art world, he stayed active in scholarly circles, taking a research position in the Marxist Institute of Zhongshan University (Guangzhou), and publishing incisively as a liberal intellectual.
Jiang Youfu 姜佑福 | Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Marxism Institute, deputy director
Jiang is concurrently a research fellow of Shanghai’s Institute for Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Editor of the Shanghai Academy’s Academic Journal, Jiang frequently comments on public issues. His academic work draws on Marx, Hegel and others with a focus on concepts of development.