context: US President Donald Trump is currently visiting Beijing. Meanwhile, according to the South China Morning Post, Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to visit the PRC just days after the PRC–US summit wraps up. Despite the close timing of the two visits, there have been no reports of plans for a meeting between the US and Russian leaders.
Xiao Bin肖斌 CASS Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies argues that although the US and Russian leaders will not appear together on the same occasion, this 'back-to-back' diplomacy sends a clear strategic signal to the international community—despite irreconcilable structural contradictions among the major powers, all parties remain willing to maintain a minimum level of strategic communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation. None of the parties is attempting to alter the overall competitive structure; rather, they are adjusting the tempo within the existing structure to create room for manoeuvre, Xiao adds.
In his opinion, the arrangements surrounding the visits of the US and Russian leaders to the PRC are intended to create a brief, limited window of stability for subsequent multilateral agendas, such as APEC and the G20.
He claims that the strategic objectives of the US and Russia towards the PRC differ markedly
- Washington hopes to stabilise PRC–US relations through limited cooperation to buy time for its own strategic adjustments
- the core objective of Trump's trip is to stabilise PRC–US economic relations and avoid the outbreak of large-scale confrontation
- Moscow, by contrast, places greater emphasis on the long-term stability of PRC–Russia relations, viewing them as an important support for coping with external pressure and for expanding its strategic room for manoeuvre
- the key focus of Putin's visit is to consolidate and develop the PRC–Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination
Through this arrangement, Xiao argues, it can be seen that 'the strategic paths of the United States and Russia towards the PRC are increasingly diverging.' Against this backdrop, the PRC is playing a unique role as a 'stabilising anchor' through summit diplomacy, providing the necessary predictability and buffer space for interactions among competing major powers, he adds.
Xiao states that trilateral relations among the PRC, the US and Russia are highly complex, and the visits to China by US and Russian leaders may be seen as a form of 'limited buffering', with the central aim of keeping competition within controllable bounds and preventing further disorderly spillover. However, he stresses that the limitations of this buffering mechanism are also clear—it is unlikely to resolve the structural contradictions in major power relations.
Viewed over a longer time horizon, the visits to the PRC by the US and Russian leaders in May 2026 demonstrate that major power competition is moving neither towards complete loss of control nor towards comprehensive détente, claims Xiao. Rather, it is gradually evolving into a new form of 'manageable competition', he explains.
Only through pragmatic balances of power, strategic restraint and interest-based bargaining can systemic collapse be avoided and 'dynamic coexistence amid competition' be achieved. For the PRC, the US and Russia, whether this form of 'limited buffering' can withstand the pressures of the international system and prevent competition from escalating into direct confrontation will ultimately depend on whether all three can demonstrate the necessary degree of strategic restraint, he concludes.