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Under pressure of US disdain for multilateral trade norms—global trade is showing signs of breaking into blocs. Beijing is responding with unilateral moves, both opening and closing.
It has rolled out a sanctions and export-control regime for ‘dual use’ goods and strategic tech, and passed trade laws with extraterritorial scope, learning from the US model. First conceived as defensive, those laws provide a basis for Beijing’s recent, more assertive move to impose export licensing on rare earths, which can be used to divide friends from foes in the trade sphere.
At the same time, under the slogan of ‘unilateral opening-up,’ it is making moves that expand Beijing’s circle of like-minded partners, including visa-free travel and lowering restrictions on foreign direct investment.
Beijing updated its trade strategy at the Party’s Third Plenum in 2024, setting a long-term vision toward 2035. The WTO is less relevant as exports become digital and states embrace industrial policy and view trade through a security lens- but the Plenum decided to support the WTO as much as possible.
The PRC doesn’t see itself as having the kind of trade and financial dominance that would allow it to set a global trade order or ‘Bretton Woods II’.
Instead, it is hedging WTO support by pushing for bilateral and regional trade deals. The strategy is dual-track: align with global rules where interests converge, while also proposing PRC institutional solutions. Not overcommitting to a single model gives Beijing flexibility, but this comes at the cost of coherence in global trade governance and can erode trust among international partners.
Trade deals are an important element in what the Plenum called ‘institutional openness’. This is about Beijing using trade agreements to pressure obstructive local governments to push forward domestic reforms to make its economy more efficient, innovation-driven and low-carbon.
‘High quality’ (standards, IP, ESG, labour) trade deals could constrain local subsidies, favouritism in procurement, and remove barriers in service sectors. This approach opens the door to dialogue with trading partners who share these priorities and want greater access to PRC markets.
Beijing advocates what it dubs ‘open trade’ while it eschews ‘free trade.’ The distinction is critical: ‘open trade’ is about orderly flow of resources with state guidance and, while it shields itself from security and environmental risk, Beijing is looking for partners who align with its development goals.
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