When the Hormuz strait effectively closed in April 2026, Beijing rode out the oil-price shock better than its Asian neighbours, and in doing so helped shape how the shock played out worldwide. Crude imports fell from around 11.7 mb/d in February to under 9 mb/d by late May, drawing on strategic reserves that had reached some 1.4 billion barrels.
Baseline thinking, dixian siwei底线思维, entered Xi Jinping's vocabulary in 2013. Alert to how such formulae shape policy, CHINA POLICY began to keep a weather eye on it. What is new in 2026 is reach. A formula minted for national security now turns up in flood directives and stock exchange plans, in energy strategy and EV positioning, in Politburo study sessions and township emergency drills.
Beijing's 'new humanities' signal a bid to recast traditional disciplines as a strategic resource in the AI era. MoE (Ministry of Education) is retooling ethics, culture and critical thinking into interdisciplinary programs integrating big data and AI. The aim is to anchor technological development in PRC values and strengthen discourse power (话语权) in global governance.
The 'China Agricultural Outlook Report (2026–35)', the annual ten-year projection from MARA (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs), opens on a confident supply story. Grain output reached 715 million tonnes in 2025, the second year above 700 million tonnes, and is forecast to reach 753 million tonnes by 2035. The record harvest has not eased the mood. Capacity is rising. Confidence is not.